

The Future of Just Military Force and Christianity

Richard M. Skorik

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Preface

This paper will look at the decisions that face Christians today about the use of military force. After touching on why questions about the use of military force have caused disagreement among Christians for centuries, and continue to do so after the Cold War, the focus will shift to the future of military engagements in the near future.

After looking at four recent examples of the use of military force in Rwanda, Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor, the lessons drawn from them will be applied to formulate a specific and detailed plan of whom, where and how military force should be applied today. The paper ends in a conclusion highlighting why it is important for Christians to develop a constructive stance on the use of military force today.

Introduction

In recent years, the question of when it, if at all, it is acceptable for Christians to support the use of military force has gone unanswered by the churches. Since the end of the Cold War and the major geopolitical changes that occurred, no major change or study has been undertaken by the church to find out what those changes mean in the face of Christian questions about military force. With more than ten years having gone by, filled with many armed conflicts, it is time to look at today's world and the near future and see whether or not Christians can support the use of military force and if so, when and how to use it.

The first major question to evaluate is whether Christians should support the use of military force no matter what the conditions. It's an old question that goes back to early Christianity. Many point to the actions and sayings of Jesus.¹ Jesus did repudiate a disciple who struck a soldier who had come to arrest Jesus. Jesus healed the soldier and said "Put your sword back into its place, for all who take the sword will perish by the

¹ Those that reject all war and embrace pacifism and those that believe that at least some war is just look to the teachings of Jesus to defend their arguments. For a pacifist view see, Yoder, John Howard. When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just War Thinking. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996. For a viewpoint that is open to the use of war see Regan, Richard J. Just War: Principles and Cases. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 1996.

sword." (Mt 26:52)* In the Beatitudes, Jesus said, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God." (Mt 5:9) Jesus went on to teach "...if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also...and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile." (Mt 39, 41) Jesus also says to "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you." (Mt 5:44) With so much instruction and example coming from Jesus, there is a strong argument to be made that Christians should at no time use or support military force. Many Christians believe and practice this.² However, there are other sayings and actions of Jesus that call into question whether opposition to the use of military force in all situations is what Jesus had in mind.

After Jesus' Sermon on the Plain, there is a story about Jesus healing a centurion's slave. In that story, a centurion, who was a Roman soldier in charge of about 100 troops, has a favorite slave who is sick.³ After Jesus hears the from the messengers sent by the centurion, he heals his slave, and says to the crowd of the centurion, "I

* All biblical quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard Version.

² People like conscientious objectors fit into this category. See Yoder, When War is Unjust, p. 6 for a discussion on conscientious objection.

³ Meeks, Wayne A., general ed., et al, The Harper Collins Study Bible. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993. p. 1970.

tell you, not even in Israel have I found such faith." (Lk 7:9) Jesus clearly does not rebuke the soldier, even a gentile soldier, for being a soldier. Jesus is not alone in this thinking. John the Baptist was asked by a soldier "What should we (soldiers) do?" (Lk 3:14) John answers him "Do not extort money from anyone by threats or false accusation, and be satisfied with your wages." (Lk 3:14) John the Baptist, like Jesus, does not instruct soldiers to give up their profession and never kill another human being. Instead, both Jesus and John the Baptist seem to treat being a soldier like any other calling. It appears that a soldier can be a follower of Jesus without giving up his career. It is a soldier's job to kill; but it is also his job to die for others. Jesus clearly taught that dying for others is important in that, "No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends." (Jn 15:13) While Jesus did advocate turning the other cheek and love for one's enemies, he also did not condemn those whose job it was to kill.

It seems like contradictory stances that Jesus would preach to all to love their enemies and gladly suffer punishment, but would not call for an end to armies and soldiers, whose very profession was to be very good at killing, which is clearly not loving your enemies. There

is clear evidence that Jesus wanted his followers to refrain from the use of all military force, but also clear evidence he was not opposed to there being military force. If one sees that soldiers can be followers of Jesus and thus that there will be an military in existence, then when should this military be used? Under what conditions should a Christian support the use of military force?

Saint Augustine (354-430) tried to tackle this question. He believed that Christians could support and take part in the use of military force if certain conditions were met. The seven guidelines set down by Augustine included that there be public authority, meaning that only governments had the power to wage wars and private citizens did not; that there be just cause, so that war was not conducted for material gain, it must only be conducted for the protection of innocent life; the end goal in any war must be a just peace; war can only be fought if the acts committed against the innocent are grievous enough to warrant war; that there is proportionality and that the war will not cause more harm than it will prevent; the war must have a probable chance of victory; and finally that all other means of peaceful resolution be tried before war

is started.⁴ These criteria deal with the "when" part of military force, but just as important is the "how." Augustine deals with this question as well.

If a war can meet all the criteria above, then it still must be justly fought. The three criteria are that nothing be done to the enemy that would cause lasting hatred; the use of strategies that would cause more harm than good is forbidden; and finally that noncombatants must never be targeted.⁵ Once again all these criteria must be met for a war to be just. These guidelines also open up a huge debate on interpretation.

Every one of the criteria used by Augustine could mean very different things to different reasonable people. For example, when are all other options exhausted and war is the last option? Some would say that there is always a chance for diplomacy to work, and thus war would be unjustifiable.⁶ Others would argue for war after a stall in diplomatic talks. The problem of interpretation is not limited to the question of when to go to war, but also how to fight a war.

⁴ Augustine, Aurelius. The City of God Against the Pagans. Translated and edited by R.W. Dyson. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 925-933.

⁵ Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans. p. 933-937.

⁶ Another argument frequently made by pacifists. See, Harvey, A.E. Demanding Peace: Christian Responses to War and Violence. London: SCM, 1999.

The criteria for fighting a just war are similar to those of when to go to war and have interpretation problems as well. For instance, what if an airplane is to bomb a military base in a residential area and the bombs miss the mark, killing noncombatants? Noncombatants were not targeted but were still killed; does this amount to an unjust war? That's not even questioning what is a noncombatant; are they all civilians, only civilians that do not partake in industries that support the war effort, or are there any noncombatants since citizens pay taxes that keep a states war machine going? Similar arguments that can be made for each guideline above. That is one of the problems with these guidelines.

Some people could justify any war with these guidelines, while some people would see any war as unjust.⁷ In the end these Augustine's guidelines would best be used with reason. Such as acknowledging when diplomacy has no reasonable chance of success, while still having the patience to give diplomacy a chance to work. There can be no set number of chances or length of time for such a guideline, but using reason and patience in each individual

⁷ The divergence of opinions is extremely great on this subject. It is discussed in great detail in Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases and Winn, Albert Curry. Ain't Gonna Study War No More: Biblical Ambiguity and the Study of War. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.

situation can help sort out what is a just war. However, there is yet another major problem these guidelines.

Augustine wrote these guidelines in the 5th century A.D.⁸ Much has changed in the world and the way warfare is conducted since then. With the advent of guerrilla warfare, who really is a noncombatant? Do guerrilla armies have proper authority? They do not have a legitimate government, but they are not really private citizens or claim to be part of any existing government. The subject of nuclear arms raises a plethora of issues that would take an entire project to discuss. Augustine took on the difficult question of when and how it is right for a Christian to use military force, but his original guidelines are far outdated to be used in today's world. The guidelines must be changed and looked at in a new light for them to have meaning in today's world.

The Just War Today

At the time Augustine wrote his guidelines, there was nothing like the United Nations. In today's world, the UN will play a major role in all conflicts for the foreseeable future. Whether as a moderator in peace talks or sending military forces into a troubled area, the UN will have its

⁸ Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, p. xi.

fingerprints on all armed conflicts. This is a drastic change that has to be taken into account.

When Augustine wrote his guidelines on just war, it was impossible for him to take into account an organization such as the UN. This change requires Christians to look at the present and future of armed conflicts. While many of the armed conflicts may start on a local level due to ethnic or religious differences, the much of the world's populations will be involved is through the UN.

The UN gets involved in armed conflicts because its stated purpose is "...to maintain international peace and security..."⁹ This means preventing state-to-state conflicts as well as ethnic and genocidal ones. In recent history there have been very few state-to-state conflicts. Since the Cold War the only major one has been the Persian Gulf War. The other conflicts had a variety of causes civil to ethnic.

A pattern seems to have emerged as to when the UN will intervene militarily. In times of genocide, the UN has pushed an agenda where the right to live and be free of genocide supercedes state sovereignty and takes military action to prevent the massive amount of life. This is the

⁹ United Nations Charter Preamble,
<<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>>

reason for armed UN action in places like Rwanda and Kosovo.

Another reason for military intervention that has been tried by the UN is for humanitarian reasons. The military intervention in Somalia is an example of this. In failed states where the government collapses and chaos reigns, the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) will send food, clean water, shelter and other necessities of life. If local warlords or leaders consistently try to steal these supplies or make it unsafe to deliver these vital goods and services, the UN feels it has the right to defend, not only itself, but also the right of the people to receive humanitarian supplies. In intervening militarily for the right to deliver humanitarian supplies the UN also believes that right is above and beyond state sovereignty. Instances of humanitarian interventions, for reasons of genocide or for the ability to care for a nations people, will continue to be more frequent than instances of state-to-state war.

The question of the just war today needs to turn to the international level, focusing on the roles of the UN and the nation-states in terms of humanitarian interventions. It's difficult to directly apply Augustine's guidelines to the situation today. In recent

years, little has been written to adequately reflect on what these changes mean.

With the a majority of the future of military conflicts lying in interventions, the many questions open up as to who will provide the military muscle, under whose authority can a humanitarian intervention take place and when is it necessary to use military force?

Defining Terms

It is important to introduce some of the terms that will be used in this paper. While some of the terms may have different meanings to different people, for simplicity's sake, this paper will lay out one definition for each. The first important distinction to make is what is meant by "peacekeeping." The best definition of peacekeeping is probably:

A United Nations presence in the field (normally involving civilian and military personnel) that, with the consent of the conflicting parties, implements or monitors arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution, or ensures the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.¹⁰

¹⁰ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. "What is Peacekeeping?" May 1998. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/field/pkeep.htm>>

Peacekeeping missions will play an important role in future military interventions, especially if they are to be used more frequently to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies.

The second term that needs to be introduced is "peacemaking." Peacemaking is "The use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute."¹¹ The main difference to keep in mind here is that peacemaking is very much like peacekeeping, only without military force.

The next term, "peace enforcement," is also closely related to the previous two terms, but has a major difference. Peace enforcement is basically "The use of force against one of the parties to enforce and end to hostilities."¹² The differences to remember is that peacemaking involves diplomacy and no military force, peacekeeping involves military force only if it is invited by the parties in conflict and peace enforcement involves military force to force one party to cease hostilities.

Another important term to define is "international community." The international community is the peace-

¹¹ UN Department of Political Affairs. "Preventative Action and Peacemaking." December 12, 2000.

<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm>>

¹² UN Department of Political Affairs.

<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm>>

loving states that respect basic human rights. This obviously encompasses most states and does not by definition automatically exclude anyone. The international community makes its will known through organs like the United Nations in General Assembly votes and Security Council resolutions. Only by grossly violating human rights and/or aggressively invading another state can a state be thrown out of the international community. These rogue states or states of concern can be readmitted to the international community by cleaning up their act, playing by the rules and respecting basic human rights. There is no set list of who is in the international community, and it has a lot to do with whom you ask, but states like Iraq and North Korea are not members while states like Finland and Chile are. There are also states in a gray area like Israel, which is recognized by much of the world as a member, but most of the Arab world does not recognize its legitimacy or right to exist.

An important part of deciding who is in the international community is deciding if they are violating human rights. Listing what is and what is not a human right would be a project in itself, but when human rights is mentioned in this project it will refer to the basic right to exist, specifically being free from genocidal

persecution. There certainly are other aspects to human rights like the freedom of religion and speech, but for the scope of this paper, it will refer to the loss of the most basic right to exist.

Genocide and ethnic cleansing are other terms that need to be defined. According to the UN, genocide is an attempt to destroy, wholly or partly, members of a racial, national, ethnic or religious group by killing them, causing bodily or mental harm to them, forcibly transferring children of one group to another, preventing births within a group or intentionally making a group live under conditions that would bring about its whole or partial destruction.¹³ Ethnic cleansing is a term that came about in the wake of the events in Bosnia during the mid 1990's. It specifically refers to the attempt to wipe out an ethnic group by means that fit the description of genocide above, but also includes the imprisonment or removal of a group from a specific area or state. Genocide and ethnic cleansing represent the worst violations of human rights. This project will focus on how to prevent them from occurring when diplomacy fails.

¹³ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, <http://www.unchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm>

Four Case Studies

Rwanda

The first case study will focus on the genocide that occurred in Rwanda. Rwanda posed two major problems to the international community. The first was that there were few major potential allies in the area. Rwanda is located in the heart of Africa, where there were no major western military bases nearby. This posed a major logistical problems to adequately supplying international soldiers and observers. It also made any potential major deployments of military force very difficult to do quickly.

The second problem was that much of the murder was begun by loosely organized gangs of machete wielding peasants on orders from Hutu extremists in the government.¹⁴ Many citizens were forced to decide between attacking members and villages of the rival tribe, Hutu or Tutsi, and fleeing the violence in Rwanda. With gross human rights abuses being committed by both sides, and with no organized government, concentrating on one group would be difficult. A problem similar to this one would emerge in Somalia at nearly the same time.

¹⁴ Ball, Howard. Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The 20th Century Experience. Kansas, University Press of Kansas. 1999, p. 162-163 and 165.

With those two major hurdles facing the world community, many believed that getting involved would incur unacceptably high casualties of international soldiers, and that observers and would likely be unable to quickly and effectively end or even slow down the rate at which genocide was being committed. There were some who believed that a larger, more forceful presence could have prevented genocide from even happening. No one will know for sure if a greater international presence would have prevented genocide from occurring, but we do know that 800,000 people were killed and millions more were forcibly displaced.¹⁵

At the height of UN involvement in Rwanda from 1993-1996, its contingent included 5200 soldiers with 320 military observers.¹⁶ Compared with the sheer numbers of violence occurring all around them, 5200 soldiers would be very hard pressed to make a significant contribution to stopping such an out-of-control situation like Rwanda. However, when the violence began the UN withdraw its forces until just 270 soldiers were in all of Rwanda by July of 1994.¹⁷ With so few resources and strength to work from, international involvement that could have prevented Rwanda

¹⁵ Ball, Howard, p. 155-156.

¹⁶ United Nations Department on Public Information, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamir.htm

¹⁷ Ball, Howard, p. 169.

from spiraling out of control, were unable to do little besides watch the genocide.

Instead of relying on ineffective economic sanctions and diplomatic maneuvering, the international community would have had a better chance of making a difference in Rwanda if western governments and militaries had reacted quickly to a decision by the UN Security Council to use military force. Instead, western governments reduced the number of UN soldiers on the ground, refusing to authorize an increase in the number of UN soldiers until the genocide was nearly done.¹⁸

While there would have been no guarantee of success, and there certainly would have been international soldiers killed, but it would have provided the last chance for hundreds of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis to survive the violence in their country. If the UN had set up safety zones throughout Rwanda, defended by an international military force, there would have been shelter in a country where there was none and chaos reigned. A large international military presence could have also protected non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and UN institutions and allowed them to attend to the needs of the Rwandans. But without an international military force, none of this

¹⁸ Ball, Howard. p. 169.

was possible. No safe-havens and no international emergency organizations. Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost because of this.

In the end, the UN came out a major loser, with its credibility very much in question. Instead of making conditions in Rwanda more peaceful, it abandoned innocents in the face of evil as soon as adversity first appeared. This lack of backbone severely hampered the UN in another hotspot soon after the disaster in Rwanda.

Somalia

In 1991 and 1992, Somalia was ravaged by civil war among rival clans. A crippling drought at the same time proved disastrous, causing the death of 300,000 people, 4.5 million threatened with starvation and two million people forcibly displaced from their homes.¹⁹ With the government of Somalia effectively collapsed, humanitarian supplies were needed. A cease-fire was reached among the warring parties and the UN the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNSOM I) was sent to ensure the safe delivery of

¹⁹ United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm>

humanitarian supplies and that all parties adhered to the conditions of the cease fire.²⁰

The cease-fire wasn't adhered to and with UN humanitarian personnel and observers being attacked, the UN Security Council authorized the US to help protect international workers on December 3, 1992.²¹ The United States began Operation Restore Hope and although there were still acts of violence against international workers and among the warring clans, events had begun to calm down until the fateful day of October 3, 1993.²²

That day, the US sent the elite Army Rangers and Delta Force into downtown Mogadishu to arrest associates of a Somali warlord.²³ Armed Somalis shot down American helicopters causing confusion and a protracted that battle that lasted into the next day.²⁴ During the Battle of the Black Sea, or Day of the Rangers to Somalis, 18 Rangers died with 73 wounded and over 500 Somalis dead with over

²⁰ UNOSOM I Background text

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm>

²¹ UNOSOM I Background text

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm>

²² UNOSOM II Background text

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2.htm>

²³ The account of the entire battle is given in great detail by Mark Bowden in his book Black Hawk Down. It clearly illustrates the challenges of fighting in a hostile urban setting. Bowden covers the entire battle from the actions of the US soldiers that would later earn them the Congressional Medal of Honor to perspectives from Somalis that took part in the fight. For further reading on the military operations of the US in Somalia.

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. 1999. p. 333.

²⁴ Bowden p. 76-78.

1000 wounded.²⁵ The scenes on CNN of Army Rangers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu caused a public outcry that soon led President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces from Somalia.²⁶

The United States left Somalia in the same chaotic condition they found it in when Operation Restore Hope was started in December of 1992. A major lesson of stemming from the Somalia and the Battle of the Black Sea was what happens when full force is not used in a ground operation. After the helicopters were shut down and the streets became filled with armed Somali's, the US had not heavy tanks to send through the streets to rescue the downed crew and stranded soldiers.²⁷ While by no means would additional fire power guaranteed saving lives, it may have given officers on the field more options with which to work. Having the option of heavy armor could give future officers in the field options that may save the lives of their soldiers.

Another lesson coming out of Somalia was the dangers of the US acting alone. The UN Security Council did authorize the US to take action, but the US forces were

²⁵ Bowden p. 329 and 333.

²⁶ Bowden p. 310-311.

²⁷ Bowden, p. 341.

never under the command of the UN or any other country.²⁸ Somali warlords were easily able to paint a picture of an American invasion. The UN had soldiers from other countries there, but they wore the light blue helmets of the UN. Had the US been one of many countries operating as a joint military force, the propaganda of a US invasion used by Somali warlords to turn the populace against the US, would not have been believable if French or Brazilian soldiers would have been operating side by side with Americans.

The UN and the US were correct to take action to stop the suffering in Somalia. A major humanitarian catastrophe was under way and something needed to be done. By stressing a strong force with better international cooperation Somalia made had turned out differently. By looking at these lessons drawn from Somalia, future conflicts made had been fought more.

Kosovo

The third case study will look specifically at how the conflict in Kosovo was fought. The conflict that occurred in Kosovo in 1999 provides a good example of what

²⁸ Bowden, p. 335.

happens when a just intervention is carried out unjustly.²⁹ The UN Security Council recognized that military action was needed and authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to ensure ethnic cleansing would not occur in Kosovo as it did in Bosnia. The chances of the international community of preventing ethnic cleansing in Kosovo were very good at the time. The Serbs had few allies and its army was less than adequate.³⁰ However, fears of casualties kept the members of NATO from preventing a humanitarian disaster from occurring in Kosovo.

When entering the conflict in Kosovo, an important goal for NATO should have been to prevent a massive outflow of refugees from Kosovo that would have possibly destabilized neighboring countries. The fact that the refugees would likely be all ethnic Albanians would have led to the kind of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo that NATO had been charged with to stop. NATO needed to prevent the Serbs from being able to ethnically cleanse the province. Not only did NATO fail to prevent the Serbs from ethnically

²⁹ For a more in depth discussion on the conflict in Kosovo and traditional just war criteria, see Dentrach, Bogdau. "A Botched Just War." *Dissent*, 46, 3, 1999, p. 13-18.

³⁰ Cordesman, Anthony H. (April 22, 1999). "Yugoslav Military and Security Forces: Facts and Figures (Adapted from a British Intelligence Estimate and reporting by the IISS and Jane's)." Retrieved from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) website at <<http://www.csis.org/kosovo/YugoForces.pdf>>

cleansing the province, but still managed to wreak havoc on the infrastructure of Yugoslavia.

The basic mistake that NATO made was that it relied solely on airpower to accomplish its missions. The benefits were that NATO casualties were unlikely and that western governments would be spared from television images of their soldiers being dragged through the streets of Belgrade. Clearly this was a popular pick of many western leaders fearful of how their electorate would react to their soldiers fighting and dying in a far off land that few had heard of. However, the disadvantages of refusing to use ground forces in the conflict would lead to a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.

It was clear that western governments knew something had to be done. They had witnessed what Slobodon Milosevic was capable of five years earlier in Bosnia. The scenes of rail thin prisoners behind barbed wire in a European war, more than fifty years after Nazi Germany was defeated, was too powerful for the west to ignore. Now in 1999, once again with Milosevic the clear culprit, the west was forced to deal with mass graves and forced migrations occurring on European soil.

The western governments doubted that their electorates would tolerate a soldier's death in Yugoslavia, but still

something be done. Milosevic disregarded any diplomatic overtures refusing to make any concessions, like withdrawing his military from Kosovo.³¹ With economic sanctions having been in place on Yugoslavia since the Bosnian War, there was no other way to stop Milosevic other than military force.³² Since the use of ground forces to expel Serbian forces from Kosovo would certainly have meant western soldiers coming home in bags, a middle ground had to be found. On March 23, 1999, the western governments chose to begin using missiles and air raids, but not ground forces, to degrade Milosevic's capability to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.³³

The bombings focused on targets like oil refineries, power stations and bridges.³⁴ The idea being that without the critical infrastructure to carry out a sustained war effort, Milosevic would have to fold. That may have worked against a less determined foe, but he withered the storm and carried on with his sinister plan to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.

³¹ United States Department of State, Kosovo Chronology, 21 May 1999 (Washington D.C.),

<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo_timeline.html>

³² Clinton, William J. Executive Order 13120, 27 April 1999 (Washington D.C.), <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/eo990430_ksvo_sanct.html>

³³ Background to the Conflict.

<<http://www.kforonline.com/resources/intro.htm>>

³⁴ Cordesman, (September 29, 1999). "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo." 98-118. Retrieved from the CSIS website at <<http://www.csis.org/kosovo/LessonsText.pdf>>

As NATO rained bombs down on Yugoslavia, Serb irregulars and militia were busy on the ground in Kosovo. They managed to force 900,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo into neighboring Albania and Macedonia.³⁵ The bombings gave a convenient excuse to the Serbs that the ethnic Albanians were actually fleeing from NATO bombs, not Serb police forces. The television pictures being broadcast from Belgrade of places where stray missiles struck residential areas and lines of ethnic Albanians waiting to get into neighboring countries is what filled nightly news casts, not the Serb irregulars, militia, and police forces that worked at night evicting Kosovo Albanians from their homes.

The bombing also managed to produce two high profile disasters. The first was the Serbs shooting down a stealth bomber.³⁶ NATO's cause was not helped by the propaganda coup of scenes of old Serb women dancing on millions of dollars of America's best military technology. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade soon after the Serbs downed one of America's stealth bombers led

³⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Fact Sheet: International Kosovo Relief Effort, 26 March 2000, <<http://www.nato.int/usa/policy/d20000407a.htm>>

³⁶ Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo," 52-77.

to a diplomatic and public relations headache that took quite some time for NATO to recover from.³⁷

Despite all these problems with bombing, NATO continued to officially rule out the use of ground forces. Unofficially, it was becoming crystal clear that even if Milosevic were to fold, there would need to be a substantial number of western soldiers on the ground in Kosovo to ensure a lasting peace. Western governments began to understand this reality and make preparations to send ground forces into Kosovo. The question of if these ground forces were to be used as peacekeepers or peace enforcers was a question being cleverly avoided by western governments. It was a question they did not have to answer. The bombing ceased on June 10, 1999 when Serb forces were confirmed to have withdrawn from the province.³⁸ Western ground forces and UN agencies then moved into the province as peacekeepers to begin the process of rebuilding.

Milosevic appeared to finally give in, not because of months of bombing, but because there were clear signs that the west was finally beginning to prepare for a ground invasion. There were certainly rumors of the west finally

³⁷ Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo," 52-77.

³⁸ UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), the chronology of, at: <<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kos30day.htm>>

beginning to prepare for a ground war, but the solid evidence came when NATO authorized the US to deploy attack helicopters to the Balkans.³⁹ Attack helicopters are used mainly in conjunction with ground forces. With an ongoing air war over Yugoslavia and the prospect of a ground war becoming more and more likely, Milosevic decided to cut his losses and pull out of Kosovo.

There are many questions to come out of the Kosovo conflict, but the most pressing among them has to be what if the western governments had deployed ground forces at the outset of the conflict? A ground war with NATO would have had to make Milosevic think hard about continued resistance to the international community and if a ground war did occur, there is little doubt that the Yugoslav army would have been quickly overrun and incapable of offering credible resistance for a long period of time. This would have robbed the Serbs of the precious time they had to evict ethnic Albanians from Kosovo; precious time they did have during the bombing campaign.

If ground forces had been moving into Kosovo, there would have been no time for the Serbs to move in large numbers of militia and police force members that persecuted

³⁹ Bacevich, Andrew J. "Toward Dresden: When Bombing Goes To Far," National Review, 31 May 1999, 54.

the ethnic Albanians. The swift use of the sword would have prevented the suffering of many Serbs and Albanians throughout Yugoslavia. Instead, concerns over western casualties won out and the sealed the fate of many more tragedies in the Balkans.

East Timor

The final case study will look at East Timor. The eastern half of the island of Timor was a Portuguese colony until 1974, when independence was declared and civil war broke out between those who favored independence and those who favored joining Indonesia as a province.⁴⁰ East Timor did become a province of Indonesia, but there remained calls for independence until August 30, 1999 when there was referendum asking if East Timor should begin taking steps to become an independent country.⁴¹ After an overwhelming majority voted for independence, militias backed by Indonesian security forces began committing violent acts throughout the territory that eventually led to many deaths and 500,000 displaced people.⁴² Something had to be done to stop the violence that caused many refugees to flee East Timor and could have destabilized nearby islands.

⁴⁰East Timor-UNTAET- Background
<<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>>

⁴¹ UNTAET Background <<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>>

⁴² UNTAET Background <<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>>

The situation was beyond the control of potential peacekeeping or policing actions. Real military force was needed to stop the violence. On June 11, 1999, the UN Security Council authorized a multinational force to be sent into East Timor to protect humanitarian operations already underway throughout the territory.⁴³ This force was headed by Australia, and was able to quell the violence and quickly hand control of East Timor back to the UN by February 28, 2000.⁴⁴

East Timor is now beginning the slow transition to a fully independent state. The repatriation of those who fled East Timor has been underway for some time. The UN still has major responsibilities in running East Timor, but there is no longer the threat of widespread violence erupting. Although building East Timor to a stable and democratic state will take years, the violence that characterized the aftermath after the 1999 referendum has ceased and building for the future has begun.

A very important part about the crisis in East Timor was that the UN recognized that it could not handle the military needs on its own and authorized a force that could. This led to the UN being able to concentrate on

⁴³ UNTAET Background <<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>>

⁴⁴ UNTAET Background <<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>>

meeting the needs of the civilians in the territory, while not having to run a military campaign at the same time. The UN did not bite off more than it could chew and was able to very effectively bring peace to a violent territory.

Another important part about the recent events in East Timor was that the multinational force was led by Australia. While 47 countries had combined to send 9,446 personnel to East Timor, Australia contributed heavily to the makeup of the force and the leadership of the multinational military force that quelled the violence and restored some semblance of order.⁴⁵ With Australia's close proximity to East Timor and it being one of the more powerful countries in the area, it was a wise choice for it to take this responsibility.

Australia's successful leadership in East Timor prevented the US from having to take the lead in a military operation, which would have led to inevitable accusations of imperialism. By taking the lead role, Australia also helped to stabilize its own region by preventing the outflow of 500,000 refugees to neighboring territories. In taking this action, that directly benefited the region, and

⁴⁵East Timor-UNTAET-Facts and Figures
<<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF.htm>>

showing that it was not dependent on the US for its stabilization, the actions taken in East Timor serve as a good example of what can be done when regional powers are willing to take responsibility and cooperate with the UN Security Council.

Enforcing Peace

There are basically three ways to enforce the will of the international community on a state: diplomacy, sanctions, or war. Diplomacy could be withdrawing an ambassador or engaging in negotiations. Sanctions are usually economic, ranging from targeted bans on military goods to complete embargoes on all economic trade. War is the use of military force.

Most reasonable people and institutions believe that diplomacy should be tried first. However, it often fails, especially when dealing authoritarian states. Economic sanctions by themselves have had very little success. Slobodon Milosevic evaded sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia from the time he aided the Bosnian Serbs until he was recently elected out of office. Sanctions have been in effect on Iraq for 10 years and have not achieved either of the goals for which they were put in place, namely to throw Saddam Hussein from power and prevent him from further development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁴⁶ In the ultimate example of sanctions ineffectiveness, Fidel Castro has remained in power in Cuba for decades despite a complete embargo by the United States.

⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Resolution 687. April 3, 1991. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/scrs/scr687.htm>>

There are other problems with economic sanctions. The suffering of the civilian population of Iraq has been well documented. Much of the blame for the conditions of the Iraqi people has been blamed on the current UN Security Council backed sanctions.⁴⁷ On the surface, the sanctions seem to be what's causing the suffering in Iraq. However, the real source of the problem is Saddam Hussein and his refusal to cooperate with the United Nations in any way. The sanctions would be lifted if he allowed UN weapons inspectors into Iraq with freedom to go to any suspected areas that might be producing or storing WMD's.⁴⁸ Even while Saddam is reluctant to do that, under the food-for-oil program run by the UN, he can trade all the oil he wants for as much food and medicine as he wants.⁴⁹ Sadly, Saddam chooses to smuggle oil into neighboring countries and keep the profits for himself and his ruling clique, while inviting western media into Iraq to show what he claims sanctions are doing to his country.

Iraq provides a present day example of what's wrong with economic sanctions; they cannot enforce the will of the international community against a determined foe and

⁴⁷ Jentleson, Bruce W. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 355-359.

⁴⁸ UNSC. Resolution 687. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/scrs/scr986.htm>>

⁴⁹ UNSC. Resolution 986. April 14, 1995.
<<http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/scrs/scr986.htm>>

are indiscriminate. Even if sanctions became targeted on military goods, it would be difficult to enforce on a country like Iraq if government coffers become flush with cash. Any attempt to enforce sanctions on specific items along borders with rough terrain, like Iraq's with Turkey and Iran, seems futile. The ineffectiveness of Economic sanctions in Iraq and other places of enforcing the international community's will should give considerable pause to future uses of sanctions.

The third mode of enforcement is war. Due to the inevitable casualties, it is currently the least preferable mode of enforcement.⁵⁰ For war to effectively be a tool of enforcement today, it needs United Nations support. The original UN charter called for a permanent standing UN army drawn from member states; however, this provision was never put into practice due to fears of potential sovereignty violations.⁵¹ Instead, the UN raises military forces as the UN Security Council sees fit and as the situation requires. While some believe that a permanent UN army should be developed today, it may be best to keep the current system.

⁵⁰ Once again, there are questions as to if it is mode of enforcement at all, advocated by pacifists. See Yoder, John. When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just War Thinking. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996.

⁵¹ United Nations Charter. Chapter VII Article 45. June 26, 1945.
<<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>>

There would be benefits to creating a UN army. Soldiers could be trained specifically for peacekeeping missions. The ability to deploy quickly on the UN Security Council's word would be an improvement over the current system of negotiating with member states to raise a military force. However, this prospect raises other important issues.⁵²

First, very few countries in the world today would embrace and support the creation of a permanent UN military force. For all intents and purposes, it would be a world army controlled by an independent international body. Few countries today or in the foreseeable future would support the creation of such a force. The worry of this force being used against them would keep many member states from supporting a UN army. For the powers of the world, like the US, UK, China and Russia, this force could be seen as a potential counterweight to their power. Laws of member countries would have to be revised. Many countries would object to their citizens and their soldiers serving in a foreign army. Many other sovereignty questions would be

⁵² How much sovereignty each state should retain in today's world and in the future is a key question. It would take another project to pay the proper amount of attention to this question and evaluate the opinions of various groups. Some of the main questions on sovereignty that are pertinent to this paper are touched on though.

raised along with one other important problem with a UN army.

Secondly, questions of who is to command and comprise a UN army would add to the difficulties in creating such a force. The UN would not want lower quality soldiers from existing armies and member states would likely be unwilling to commit elite soldiers to an international army that would not be under their own control. Even if the UN did get soldiers from member states to be under permanent UN command, it would need to train them as a unit, bringing language problems into consideration. If units are segregated by country of origin, then who will command them becomes a major issue. Few member states would like to send their soldiers to the UN only to be commanded by a foreign officer. If the make-up of a UN army will be units and officers segregated by country of origin, then it would basically be the current system, only without member states having a say as to if their soldiers will be used in a given mission.

The third problem with creating a UN army is that there is already the means at hand to enforce the will of the international community. The European Union (EU), US and other states have the military capability in place to

enforce the will of the international community.⁵³ Under the current system, the UN can maintain a military presence in hotspots around the globe. It does so through cooperation with its member states and more specifically, with those member states that provide the military muscle for such operations. Being able to decide themselves on how much military support to give, when it wants to give it is an important power for many countries. This power would likely have to be surrendered if the UN had its own permanent army. The problems of creating a UN army are many, and while the current system has its problems, it can be effectively tweaked to enforce the will of the international community.

One of the most common arguments against the current system is that, depending on your country of origin, someone else should do it. Often it is heard from the developing world that the western militaries should handle the brunt of the UN military responsibilities. From Europe, the cry is heard that the US spends huge amounts on defense, so why not put it to use for the good of the international community. In the US, it is argued that Europe has to share more of the burden. After all, Europe does have twice the population of the US and Europe could

⁵³ Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, p. 297

spend more on defense if it really wants more out of UN missions.⁵⁴ Usually the worries come back to the US and its power. Outside the US, the world worries about giving significant power to the US in international military affairs. Inside the US, the worry is becoming the world's policeman, stretching its military all over the globe. Concerns over which countries will take on the military burden of future UN missions if the current system is kept need to be addressed.

The International Flow Chart

By following a clear flow chart of who intervenes where in which situations, the military burden can be shared by the entire international community. The first option is for the UN to handle a situation with its own peacekeeping forces. The second option would be for regional powers to deal forcefully with the aggressor. The third option would be to build up as broad an alliance as possible from around the world. The fourth and final option is unilateral action by the US in conjunction with a

⁵⁴ Europe appears to be making changes that will likely make it a major player in future conflicts that the UN is involved with. The current plans for a 60,000 strong force under central European command that would be used primarily for humanitarian purposes to be done by 2003 show that Europe may cease to be just an economic giant that is dependent on the US for its defense needs. See: Gordon, Philip, H. "Their Own Army? Making a European Defense Work." Foreign Affairs, 79, 4, 2000, p. 12-17.

small number of close allies such the United Kingdom. (See Attachment 1)

Beginning with the first option, in order of preference: if a situation requires armed force, the UN should attempt to handle it with a peacekeeping force raised as the need arises. This peacekeeping force would be comprised of small numbers of soldiers from as many different countries as possible. In low-intensity situations, armed UN forces are very capable of protecting themselves and overseeing the implementation of peace accords or cease-fire agreements. In places like the Western Sahara, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, UN missions have been and continue to be successful in keeping peace without a large and direct involvement from the US military.⁵⁵

As the first resort to enforce and ensure the success of peace agreements and cease-fires, the UN greatly decreases the likelihood of the US becoming the world's policeman. More important, it plays to the strengths of the UN, while simultaneously not putting undo pressure on western militaries. The UN has a reasonably successful

⁵⁵ United Nations Current Peacekeeping Operations.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm>
United Nations Completed Peacekeeping Operations.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/co_miss.htm>

track record when intervening in low-intensity conflicts.⁵⁶ Only the UN has a long history of training for police operations, where high-intensity conflict has died down and observation becomes the primary focus. The UN is the only international organization that can meet the needs of a civilian population while protecting its humanitarian efforts with military forces under its command. For these reasons, it is best for all parties involved if the UN handles as many conflicts as possible through temporary peacekeeping operations. There will certainly be times when the UN cannot handle a situation that is out of control and needs immediate action to remedy a great evil. In such times, other means of enforcement need to be considered.

The second option for enforcement is for regional allied powers to handle the situation. This would work best when cooperating with UN police and civilian agencies that may already be present in the area. When regional powers use their military force to cooperate with the UN, the need to forge large international coalitions is avoided. Action by regional blocks of power also limits

⁵⁶ Most of the success stories are not mentioned prominently in the press like Western Sahara and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (before Kosovo). For further details and statistics on completed UN missions refer to:

UN Completed Peacekeeping Operations.

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/co_miss.htm>

the military involvement to as few states as possible. This option reduces the bureaucratic dealings between governments and can save valuable time when quick action is needed. The case study on East Timor illustrated this. With Australia acting as the regional power, and acting in conjunction with the UN, further disaster was averted. The benefits from this situation were that no major amount of American military power was used, but peace was still kept even with escalating violence. This option of using regional powers has the positive points of unilateral action: quick, decisive and powerful military force, but also has the added benefit of keeping a conflict mainly localized by avoiding large military alliances and keeping the US military largely on the sidelines.

The third option is the building of a large international coalition. This option would certainly bring the muscle needed into any situation that might come up, but there are several drawbacks. First, negotiating among western powers and developing countries to form a military alliance can be very time consuming. If such a coalition could be formed, it may be too late to carry out its mission and the window of opportunity would have closed. Second, states not under immediate threat are hesitant to send their militaries into a foreign land. Third, military

decision-making is certain to be hotly debated within the coalition. It would be extremely difficult for many governments, as well as their generals, to work together when their home countries are not under direct threat.

The action taken in Kosovo, which included a broad alliance in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is an example of what can happen when many states take part in a military operation in which their own territory is not directly threatened. While there was more than enough military power to end any credible Serb threat in Kosovo, bureaucratic processes hampered any effort towards a swift resolution to the conflict. When NATO goes to war, all member nations have a say in the process, for example, Luxembourg's opinion has to be weighed along with the U.S. Problems did arise from this configuration.⁵⁷ While all members of NATO participated in some capacity in the Kosovo conflict, some, like the UK, more vocally supported the use of military force, while others, like Italy, raised doubts, but still went along with the mission. Lots of compromising behind closed doors was needed to ensure the alliance would undertake and see the conflict through. The major powers, like the US, don't like having to share power with smaller states, and the smaller states never like

⁵⁷ Bacevich, "Toward Dresden," p. 54-55.

being told what to do. When large alliances break down or fall apart another option needs to be looked at.

The fourth option is for the US to take action with a small number of close allies. This option would eliminate the bureaucratic inefficiencies of larger coalitions and alliances, but could still pose diplomatic difficulties. If the UK and US entered into a conflict without the French, France might feel slighted. If a unilateral action takes place, it is important to make especially clear the goals of the humanitarian mission. If it is not, the rest of the world would likely see it as power grabbing out of selfish interests. While a large coalition does have drawbacks, a major benefit that is lost under unilateral action is that it is difficult for a state to make a case that it is being wrongfully harassed when there is a large coalition built up against it. A state that is the target of unilateral action can easily claim its being picked on by the bullies of the west and that it just wants to be left alone. The difficulties of rallying domestic support for a unilateral mission would also be considerable. In a country like the US, trying to convince the public that a cause is worthwhile enough to send American forces abroad, while at the same time most of the rest of the world refuses to send in its forces there, is a very hard sell.

The difficulties of this option make it a last resort when all other means of enforcement have been exhausted.

When all the reasonable options are utilized and all the positive and negative aspects are weighed, the means for enforcing the will of the international community are presently at hand. The excuse that nothing can be done is unacceptable. When efforts for a negotiated peace break down, or need international supervision, one cannot argue in good conscience that nothing should be done because the means for enforcement do not exist. The means are there, the tools are there, and only the will to take responsibility and to execute a just war are what's missing.

Fighting a Just War

After a decision has been made to use military force, a decision must be made on how to use this force. It is critical to remember that there can be no checklist set in stone of what must be done in every situation, as every situation requires quite a bit of flexibility. Tying politicians and generals to a very specific set of rules is an invitation for disaster, but having no guidelines is equally dangerous. Some general guidelines must be set.

The first guideline is that there must be a willingness to use ground forces. Air or missile attacks alone, without ground forces have never remedied a situation in a timely and satisfactory manner. Some may argue that the NATO campaign in Kosovo, which used no ground forces during the conflict, is a case where air and missile power worked. A look back to the section of this paper on Kosovo addresses this and points out that the mission was neither timely nor satisfactorily carried out. Even if it was a success, there are still thousands of soldiers from NATO and Russia in Kosovo today keeping a fragile peace.⁵⁸

While the disadvantages of using ground forces include casualties and high monetary cost, there is one major advantage that far outweighs them. With ground forces, casualties are likely to be much lower than the casualties caused by an extended bombing campaign. While much remains dependent on the individual situation, a recent conflict illustrates this point.

⁵⁸ A total of 42,500 soldiers are in Kosovo with an additional 7,500 acting as support units in Macedonia, Greece and Albania. 30 countries make up the 50,000 strong force. Besides the NATO members, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Jordan, Lithuania, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates are represented by soldiers in and around Kosovo. For up to date information on the military force in Kosovo, the website of KFOR is a excellent source at <<http://www.kforonline.com>>

As evidenced in the case study of Kosovo, the exodus of refugees from Kosovo into neighboring countries and the digging of mass graves necessitated by genocidal Serbian attacks could have been prevented if ground forces were there to stop them. The NATO bombing did not protect civilians, while ground forces could have. Although international soldiers, including Americans, will be killed, if a situation is dire enough to require American soldiers on the ground, the small number of military casualties will pale in comparison to the number of civilian casualties that would have occurred as a result of not taking proper action and using ground forces. The second guideline addresses the question of how to limit the casualties of international soldiers.

The second guideline of fighting a just war in a humanitarian situation is to use overwhelming force. This includes ground, naval and air power. International soldiers should not be undersupplied when sent into a humanitarian situation. Using the advantages that come with advanced weaponry and training will keep the casualties of international soldiers and civilians to a minimum. A conflict that pits an international force against a largely isolated state or nation will result in a rather short conflict.

While no single nation would be able to withstand a conventional war against a determined international community, a longer guerrilla war and terrorism is possible. This is a legitimate nightmare of politicians and generals around the world. However, this fear is no reason to rule out the use of ground forces in all humanitarian situations. If a situation has come to the point that ground forces are needed to stop the bleeding, risks have to be weighed and taken. The fear of what might happen should not prevent the international community from stopping the atrocities that are happening. To prevent an international force from being bogged down for an unacceptably long period of time, it is important to look at the transition to civilian rule after the military operation is finished.

Transition to Peace

The last guideline in fighting a war in humanitarian situations deals with who is on the ground fighting. A military decision to unleash the elite units of a military force to do the initial fighting shortens a conflict's duration. The intensity and overwhelming force that can be applied with these units would break the back of any third world military force. At the same time, elite units should not be deployed for long periods of time. The US Army's

82nd Airborne division is trained so that on 18 hours notice they can be prepare to deploy any where in the world."⁵⁹ The soldiers in this unit, and units like it, are trained for intense combat situations year-round, not for light peacekeeping or police work.

After the main source of the human rights violations has been defeated and contained, it is time to pull out elite unites and use general infantry forces to finish any remaining resistance. This can spread the burden of military missions overseas more evenly among the units within a military force. Asking elite units to see a humanitarian mission all the way from start to finish is not what they are trained to do. The elite units will do what they do best; win in combat situations. Larger infantry forces can take up the long task of clearing out pockets of resistance. This plays to the strengths of both kinds of units and increases the likelihood of a timely transition to civilian rule. Units like the US Army Rangers are well suited to lead the way into combat, but the more numerous infantry divisions are better suited to handle a long mission that covers a large land area and requires lots of labor. When the last major pockets of

⁵⁹ The 82nd Airborne (the All Americans) homepage at <<http://www.bragg.army.mil/www-82DV/>> is a fountain of information on airborne training and history.

meaningful military resistance are finished off, it is time for the large military force to go home.

After hostilities have been ceased, international observers and aid workers a large force of soldiers from the international community is no longer needed and should withdrawn. To replace these soldiers and maintain the peace until local civilian rule can be established, the UN should have a permanent international police force ready for to go. This police force would not be made up not of soldiers, but of police officers. This police force can be a vital bridge between open hostilities and the uneasy transition to rebuilding a peaceful society.

The police force is critical to have in place when the military force withdraws. It is unlikely that a provisional government would have the resources to put forth a reliable police force that is trusted by all citizens. Without a force to patrol borders and perform even mundane tasks like enforcing traffic laws, the likelihood of a speedy rebuilding process is considerably lessened.

Another key to the international police force is that it is an ideal way to incorporate the third world into the process. Many poorer countries do not have the military hardware to contribute significantly to combat operations,

but they could be very important in finding enough police officers to help stabilize an area. Putting the police officers on the UN payroll and training giving them further training according to international norms could also enhance the quality of police forces in their home states when they return and can teach their peers what they have learned.

These guidelines can help to stop genocide, enforce the will of the international community, and limit human suffering on all parties involved. There is no cure all to every situation and each situation must be judged based on its own unique circumstances; but these are some general guidelines that can help to decide how to use force in humanitarian situations.

Conclusion

Throughout this project, it has been demonstrated that Christians need to look at military force in a new way. There has been a failure to keep up with the rapidly changing world. With the end of the communist threat and massive military build-ups, Christians must evaluate the morality of the new ways military force is employed.

It has become clear that strict pacifist ideas of refraining from force in all situations are not realistic and can do more harm than good in today's world. The difficult question is the specifics of when and how to use military force. A definite answer has escaped the world so far, but there are options available today and in the future that can help answer those questions.

When all other peaceful options fail, military force should be used in situations where genocidal amounts of killing and displacement occur. Military force is a powerful tool and should not be abused. It should be used only in the most drastic of situations. Military force is not your family physician to be used for regular check-ups and preventative maintenance, but it is the tourniquet that stops the bleeding in emergencies.

As we have seen, when it is decided that military force should be used, the hard work and hard decisions have

just begun. Possible answers to the question of who will be the military force have been laid out. Once the correct source has been chosen, it is important to be very flexible to the unique demands of each situation. Cultural, geographic and logistical considerations need to be taken into account in every instance.

While a great amount of flexibility is needed, there are some guidelines in applying force that should be followed. The willingness and the ability to use ground forces in any instance is a key to success and the first major guideline. Airpower alone is an ineffective method of enforcement and will likely lead to greater suffering, a longer overall conflict and greater financial cost. The examination of Kosovo illustrated this point.

The next major guideline is to secure the support of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council is the best international institution that has the power and ability to use military force as a representative of the international community. There is currently no perfect authority to grant international military intervention but the UN Security Council is by far the best option in today's world.

The longer the church and Christians delay in changing the way of thinking about military force, the grayer the

picture will become. It has now been over ten years since the fall of the Soviet Union, and many believe the questions of military force should take a back seat to questions of who pays for senior citizens prescription drugs or where to drill for oil. Soon, that way of thinking may change. If the 1990's were any indication of the future, there will soon be another area of the world where genocide threatens to rear its ugly head. In places like Colombia, and especially China, the potential for a humanitarian crisis in the near future is very real.⁶⁰ Once again, the international community will need to react to prevent atrocities from happening. How much longer will Christians go without leadership on the question of military force? Another instance of Christians being on the sidelines during a military intervention will not enhance its image to the soldiers involved and to the world's population.

On the recent occasions Christians have taken a stand on military questions, they have been on specific matters that don't deal with larger questions such as when to use the military. For example, ELCA has taken a stance that

⁶⁰ China especially could present problems with its aggressive history in Tibet and its transition to an open society, a possible backlash from hardliners is a possibility for future instability. See, Timperlake, Edward and Triplett, William, C. II. Red Dragon Rising. Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing Company, 1999.

demands the Navy stop using Vieques Island in Puerto Rico as a bombing range, but has shied away from questions of if the bombing of Kosovo was just.⁶¹ The Christian church is not alone in failing to set a clear policy on when to use military force; the United States government still has not clearly defined when it would flex its military muscle. The idea that military force should be used to defend national interests means nothing because no one knows exactly what those interests are. They could range from only when the US is directly attacked to whenever peacekeepers are needed by the UN.

The question of when to use military force affects all people, from those trapped under genocidal rulers to soldiers in western militaries to the citizens whose tax dollars support them. It is a problem that will not solve itself and if the answer is pushed back even further, the severe divisiveness that will afflict society should be of no surprise when a major military confrontation occurs.

Looking back to the short sightedness of Europe's rulers on the eve of World War I, many today can only wonder how they were so wholly unprepared for a new generation of military force. The result of that lack of

⁶¹ ELCA News Service, <News@elca.org> "Church Leaders Ask Bush to Remove U.S. Navy from Vieques," April 20, 2001, <ELCANEWS@LISTSERV.ELCA.ORG> via <<http://www.listserv.elca.org/archives/elcanews.html>> (April 20, 2001).

vision and leadership cost millions of lives. The past and ongoing disasters in Rwanda, Somalia, East Timor and Kosovo as well as many other places have yet to reach the number of lives lost during World War I. But the number of lives lost from the current lack of courage and vision will continue to increase in the years ahead if action is not taken.

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